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Abstract
Network configuration verification enables operators to en-
sure that the network will behave as intended, prior to de-
ployment of their configurations. Although techniques rang-
ing from graph algorithms to SMT solvers have been pro-
posed, scalable configuration verification with sufficient pro-
tocol support continues to be a challenge. In this paper,
we show that by combining equivalence partitioning with
explicit-state model checking, network configuration verifi-
cation can be scaled significantly better than the state of the
art, while still supporting a rich set of protocol features. We
propose Plankton, which uses symbolic partitioning to man-
age large header spaces and efficient model checking to ex-
haustively explore protocol behavior. Thanks to a highly ef-
fective suite of optimizations including state hashing, partial
order reduction, and policy-based pruning, Plankton success-
fully verifies policies in industrial-scale networks quickly
and compactly, at times reaching a 10000× speedup com-
pared to the state of the art.
1 Introduction
Ensuring correctness of networks is a difficult and critical
task. A growing number of network verification tools are tar-
geted towards automating this process as much as possible,
thereby reducing the burden on the network operator. Verifi-
cation platforms have improved steadily in the recent years,
both in terms of scope and scale. Starting from offline data
plane verification tools like Anteater [19] and HSA [13], the
state of the art has evolved to support real-time data plane
verification [15, 12], and more recently, analysis of configu-
rations [6, 5, 7, 1, 25].
Configuration analysis tools such as Batfish [6], ERA [5],
ARC [7] and Minesweeper [1] are designed to take as input a
given network configuration, a correctness specification, and
possibly an “environment” specification, such as the maxi-
mum expected number of failures, external route advertise-
ments, etc. Their task is to determine whether, under the
given environment specification, the network configuration
will always meet the correctness specification. As with most
formal verification domains, the biggest challenge in con-
figuration analysis is scalability. Being able to analyze the
behavior of multiple protocols executing together is a non-
trivial task. Past verifiers have used a variety of techniques
to try to surmount this scalability challenge. While many of
them sacrifice their correctness or expressiveness in the pro-
cess, Minesweeper maintains both by modeling the network
using SMT constraints and performing the verification us-
ing an SMT solver. However, we observe that this approach
scales poorly with increasing problem size (4+ hours to
check a 245-device network for loops, in our experiments).
So, this paper addresses the following question: Can a con-
figuration verification tool have broad protocol support, and
also scale well?
We begin our work by observing that scalability chal-
lenges in configuration verification stem from two factors
— the large space of possible packet headers, and the pos-
sibly diverse outcomes of control plane execution, particu-
larly in the presence of failures. We believe that general pur-
pose SAT/SMT techniques are not as well equipped to tackle
these challenges as domain-specific techniques specifically
designed to address them. In fact, these challenges have been
studied extensively, in the domains of data plane verification
and software verification. Data plane verification tools an-
alyze the large header space to determine all possible data
plane behaviors and check their correctness. Software veri-
fication techniques explore the execution paths of software,
including distributed software, and identify undesirable ex-
ecutions that often elude testing. Motivated by the success
of the analysis algorithms in these domains, we attempted
to combine the two into a scalable configuration verification
platform. The result — Plankton — is a configuration ver-
ifier that uses equivalence partitioning to manage the large
header space, and explicit-state model checking to explore
protocol execution. Thanks to these efficient analysis tech-
niques, and an extensive suite of domain-specific optimiza-
tions, Plankton delivers consistently high verification perfor-
mance.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
02
12
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 5 
No
v 2
01
9
Feature Batfish BagPipe ARC ERA Minesweeper Plankton
All data planes, including failures # # G# #   
Support beyond specific protocols  # #    
Soundness when assumptions hold    G#∗   
∗ For segmentation policies only
Figure 1: Comparison of configuration verification systems
Our key contributions are as follows:
• We define a configuration verification paradigm that com-
bines packet equivalence computation and explicit-state
model checking.
• We develop optimizations that make the design feasible
for networks of practical scale, including optimizations to
reduce the space of event exploration, and techniques to
improve efficiency of exploration.
• We implement a Plankton prototype with support for
OSPF, BGP and static routing, and show experimentally
that it can verify policies at practical scale (less than a
second for networks with over 300 devices). Plankton out-
performs the state of the art in all our tests, in some cases
by as much as 4 orders of magnitude.
2 Motivation and Design Principles
Configuration verifiers take as input the configuration files
for network devices, and combine them with an abstraction
of the lower layers — the distributed control plane, which ex-
ecutes to produce data plane state, and the forwarding hard-
ware that will use that state to process traffic. They may ad-
ditionally take an environment specification, which describes
interactions of entities external to the network, such as pos-
sible link failures, route advertisements, etc. Their task is to
verify that under executions enabled by the supplied config-
uration and environment, correctness requirements are never
violated. Configuration verifiers thus help ensure correctness
of proposed configurations prior to deployment.
Figure 1 illustrates the current state of the art in configura-
tion verification. As the figure shows, only Minesweeper [1]
can reason about multiple possible converged data plane
states of the network (e.g., due to topology changes or con-
trol plane non-determinism), while also having the ability to
support more than just a specific protocol, and maintaining
soundness of analysis. All other tools compromise on one
or more key features. ARC [7], for example, uses graph al-
gorithms to compute the multiple converged states enabled
by failures, but only for shortest-path routing. As a result it
cannot handle common network configurations such as BGP
configurations that use LocalPref, any form of recursive rout-
ing, etc. The reason for the mismatch in Minesweeper’s
functionality in contrast to others is that it makes a dif-
ferent compromise. By using an SMT-based formulation,
Minesweeper is able to achieve good data plane coverage
and feature coverage, but pays the price in performance. As
experiments show [2], Minesweeper scales poorly with net-
work size, and is unable to handle networks larger than a
few hundred devices in reasonable time. Our motivation for
Plankton is simple — can we design a configuration verifi-
cation tool without compromising scale or functionality?
Achieving our goal requires tackling two challenges:
packet diversity and data plane diversity. Packet diversity,
which refers to the large space of packets that needs to be
checked, is easier to handle. We leverage the notion of Packet
Equivalence Classes (PECs), which are sets of packets that
behave identically. Using a trie-based technique similar to
VeriFlow [15], we compute PECs as a partitioning of the
packet header space such that the behavior of all packets in
a PEC remains the same throughout Plankton’s exploration.
A more interesting aspect of PECs is how to handle depen-
dencies across PECs without compromising performance. In
Plankton, this is done by a dependency-aware scheduler de-
signed to maximize independent analysis (§ 3.2).
Data plane diversity refers to the complexity of check-
ing every possible converged data plane that an input net-
work configuration may produce. It is the task of the control
plane model to ensure coverage of these possible outcomes.
Simulation-based tools (the best example being Batfish [6])
execute the system only along a single non-deterministic
path, and can hence miss violations in networks that have
multiple stable convergences, such as certain BGP configu-
rations. ARC’s graph-based approach accounts for possible
failures, but can support only shortest-path routing. In order
to overcome these shortcomings, Minesweeper, the current
state of the art in terms of functionality, uses an SMT solver
to search through possible failures and non-deterministic
protocol convergence, to find any converged state that rep-
resents a violation of network correctness.
A key intuition behind our approach is that the generic
search technique employed by SMT solvers makes the core
of the configuration verification problem much more diffi-
cult than it has to be. Network control planes operate using
simple algorithms which can not only be easily modeled in
software, but can also find a protocol’s outcome much more
quickly than general-purpose SMT solving. In fact, the com-
mon case is that the control plane computes some variant of
shortest or least-cost paths. To illustrate this point, we im-
plemented simple single-source shortest path solvers in SMT
(Z3) and a model checker (SPIN). The SMT formulation is
implemented as constraints on the solution, while the model
checker explores execution paths of the Bellman-Ford algo-
rithm; and in this simplistic case the software has determinis-
tic execution. The result is that the model checker approach
is similar to a normal execution of software, and is around
12,000× faster even in a moderate-sized fat tree network of
N = 180 nodes (Figure 2).
Of course, this is intentionally a simplistic, fully-
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Figure 2: Comparison of two ways to compute shortest paths.
deterministic case with simple implementations. The point is
that the model checking approach begins with a huge advan-
tage — so huge that it could explore many non-deterministic
execution paths and still outperform SMT. This leads to our
next key intuition: the effect of non-determinism is impor-
tant, but the amount of “relevant” non-determinism is lim-
ited. Networks can experience “relevant” non-determinism
like the choice of what failures occur, and protocol execu-
tion; as well as “irrelevant” non-determinism like message
timing that ultimately doesn’t affect the outcome. Configura-
tions and protocols are usually designed to keep the outcome
mostly deterministic, with non-deterministic branch points
ultimately leading to one or a small number of different con-
verged states.
Motivated by this intuition, we create a control plane
model that incorporates the possible non-deterministic be-
haviors, but we also implement optimizations so that when
the outcome of the executions is actually deterministic, the
“irrelevant” non-determinism is pruned enough that perfor-
mance is comparable to simulation. This model is ex-
haustively explored by SPIN, a model checker designed for
Promela programs. SPIN performs a depth-first search on
the state space of the program, looking for states that violate
the policy being checked. We further assist SPIN through op-
timizations that minimize the size of individual states, thus
making the traversal process more efficient. Thanks to these
two types of optimizations, Plankton achieves our goal of
scalable, general-purpose configuration verification.
3 Plankton Design
We now present Plankton’s design, illustrated in Figure 3.
3.1 Packet Equivalence Classes
The first phase in Plankton’s analysis is the computation of
Packet Equivalence Classes. As we discussed in § 2, Plank-
ton uses a trie-based technique inspired by VeriFlow. The
trie in Plankton holds prefixes obtained from the configu-
ration, including any prefixes that are advertised (explicitly
or automatically), any prefixes appearing in route maps, any
static routes, etc. Each prefix in the trie is associated with
a config object, that describes any configuration information
that is specific to that prefix. For example, consider Fig-
ure 4, which illustrates a highly simplified example where
the prefixes 128.0.0.0/1 and 192.0.0.0/2 are being
advertised over OSPF in a topology with 3 devices. The trie
holds three config objects — the default, and one for each
advertised prefix.
Once the trie is populated, Plankton performs a recur-
sive traversal, simultaneously keeping track of where the
prefix boundaries define division of the header space. For
each known partition, it stores the most up-to-date network-
wide config known. When the end of any new prefix
is reached, the config object that is associated with it is
merged with the network-wide config for the partition that
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Figure 3: Plankton design
denotes the prefix. In our simple example, the traversal pro-
duces three classes defined by ranges — [192.0.0.0,
255.255.255.255] with two nodes originating prefixes,
[128.0.0.0, 191.255.255.255] with only one ori-
gin, and [0.0.0.0, 127.255.255.255] without any
node originating any prefix. As the example shows, each
PEC-specific configuration computed this way will still in-
clude information about the original prefixes contributing to
the PEC. Storing these prefixes may seem redundant. How-
ever, note that even within a PEC, the lengths of the prefixes
that get advertised or get matched in route filters play a role
in decision making.
3.2 Dependency-aware Scheduling
It is tempting to believe that Packet Equivalence Classes
could be analyzed fully independently of each other, and that
an embarrassingly parallel scheme could be used in the ver-
ification process. While this is indeed true sometimes, there
can often be dependencies between various PECs. For exam-
ple, consider a network that is running iBGP. For the various
peering nodes to be able to communicate with each other,
an underlying routing protocol such as OSPF should first es-
tablish a data plane state that forwards packets destined to
the devices involved in BGP. In such a network, the manner
in which OSPF determines the forwarding behavior for the
device addresses will influence the routing decisions made
in BGP. In other words, the PECs that are handled by BGP
depend on the PECs handled by OSPF. In the past, configu-
ration verification tools have either ignored such cases alto-
gether, or, in the case of Minesweeper, modeled these classes
simultaneously. Specifically, for a network of with n routers
running iBGP, Minesweeper creates n+1 copies of the net-
work, searching for the converged solution for the n loop-
back addresses and also BGP. Effectively, this turns the veri-
fication problem into one quadratically larger than the origi-
nal. Given that configuration verification scales significantly
worse than linearly in input size, such a quadratic increase in
input size often makes the problem intractable.
Plankton goes for a more surgical approach. Once the
PECs are calculated, Plankton identifies dependencies be-
tween the Packet Equivalence Classes, based on recursive
routing entries, BGP sessions, etc. The dependencies are
stored as a directed graph, whose nodes are the PECs, and
directed edges indicate which PECs depend on which others.
In order to maximize parallelism in verification runs across
PECs, a dependency-aware scheduler first identifies strongly
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connected components in the graph. These SCCs represent
groups of PECs that are mutually dependent, and hence need
to be analyzed simultaneously through a single verification
run. In addition, if an SCC is reachable from another, it in-
dicates that the upstream SCC can be scheduled for analysis
only after the one downstream has finished. Each verification
run is a separate process. For an SCC S, if there is another
SCC S′ that depends on it, Plankton forces all possible out-
comes of S to be written to an in-memory filesystem (S will
always gets scheduled first). Outcomes refer to every possi-
ble converged state for S, together with the non-deterministic
choices made in the process of arriving at them. When the
verification of S′ gets scheduled, it reads these converged
states, and uses them when necessary.
Minesweeper’s technique of replicating the network
roughly corresponds to the case where all PECs fall into a
single strongly connected component. We expect this to al-
most never be the case. In fact, in typical cases, the SCCs
are likely to be of size 1, meaning that every PEC can be
analyzed in isolation, with ordering of the runs being the
only constraint∗. For example, Figure 5 illustrates the de-
pendency graph for a typical case where two PECs are being
handled in iBGP on a network with 4 different routers. The
only constraint in this case is that the loopback PECs should
be analyzed before the iBGP PECs can start. In such cases,
Plankton’s keeps the problem size significantly smaller, and
maximizes the degree of parallelism that can be achieved.
When a PEC needs the relevant converged states of past
PECs for its exploration, the non-deterministic choices may
need to be coordinated across all these PECs. In particu-
lar, consider the choice of link failures: if we hypothetically
executed one PEC assuming link L has failed and another
PEC assuming L is working, the result represents an invalid
execution of the overall network. Therefore, our current
prototype matches topology changes across explorations. A
second class of non-deterministic choices is protocol non-
determinism. In our experiments, we have not seen cases
of protocol non-determinism that requires matching across
PECs. OSPF by its nature has deterministic outcomes, but
on networks which have non-determinism in their internal
routing (e.g., non-deterministically configured BGP for in-
∗An example where the SCCs are bigger than one PEC is the contrived
case where there exists a static route for destination IP A whose next hop is
IP B, but another static route for destination IP B whose next hop is IP A.
ternal routing) and where message timing is correlated across
PECs (e.g., via route aggregation), the system would need to
coordinate this non-determinism to avoid false positives.
3.3 Explicit-state Model Checker
The explicit state model checker SPIN [9] provides Plankton
its exhaustive exploration ability. SPIN verifies models writ-
ten in the Promela modeling language, which has constructs
to describe possible non-deterministic behavior. SPIN’s ex-
ploration is essentially a depth-first search over the possible
states of the supplied model. Points in the execution where
non-deterministic choices are made represent branching in
the state space graph.
Plankton’s network model is essentially an implementa-
tion of the control plane in Promela. Our current implemen-
tation supports OSPF, BGP and static routing. Recall from
§ 3.1 that Plankton partitions the header space into Packet
Equivalence Classes. For each SCC, Plankton uses SPIN to
exhaustively explore control plane behavior. In order to im-
prove scalability, Plankton also performs another round of
partitioning by executing the control plane for each prefix
in the PEC separately. This separation of prefixes is helpful
in simplifying the protocol model. However, it does limit
Plankton’s support for route aggregation. While features
such as a change in the routing metric can be supported, if
there is a route map that performs an exact match on the ag-
gregated prefix, it will not apply to the more specific routes,
which Plankton models. Once the converged states of all rel-
evant prefixes are computed, a model of the FIB combines
the results from the various prefixes and protocols into a sin-
gle network-wide data plane for the PEC.
In what follows, we present Plankton’s network model that
will be executed by SPIN. We will initially present a simple,
unoptimized model, which is functionally correct but has sig-
nificant non-determinism that is irrelevant to finding differ-
ent converged states. Subsequently, in § 4, we discuss how
Plankton attempts to minimize irrelevant non-determinism,
making the execution of the deterministic fragments of the
control plane comparable to simulation.
3.4 Abstract Protocol Model
To define a control plane suitable for modeling real world
protocols such as BGP and OSPF, we look to the technique
used by Minesweeper wherein the protocols were modeled
as instances of the stable paths problem. Along similar lines,
we consider the Simple Path Vector Protocol [8], which was
originally proposed to solve the stable paths problem. We
first extend SPVP to support some additional features that
we wish to model. Based on this, we construct a protocol
we call the Reduced Path Vector Protocol, which we show to
be sufficient to correctly perform model checking, if we are
interested only in the converged states of the network. We
use RPVP as the common control plane protocol for Plank-
ton. We begin with a brief overview of SPVP, highlighting
our extensions to the protocol. Appendix A contains the full
details of the protocol and our extensions.
3.4.1 SPVP and its extension
SPVP is an abstract model of real-world BGP, replacing the
details of BGP configurations with abstract notions of im-
port/export filters and ranking functions. For each node n
and peer n′, the import and export filters dictate which ad-
vertisements (i.e. the advertiser’s best path to the origin) n
can receive from and send to n′, respectively. The ranking
function for n dictates the preference among all received ad-
vertisements. These notions can be inferred from real-world
configurations.
We slightly extend the original SPVP [8] to support more
features of BGP. The extensions are as follows: we allow for
multiple origins instead of a single one; the ranking function
can be a partial order instead of a total one to allow for time
based tie breaking; and to be able to model iBGP, we allow
the ranking function of any node to change at any time during
the execution of protocol.
It is well known that there are configurations which can
make SPVP diverge in some or all execution paths. How-
ever, our goal is only to check the forwarding behavior in the
converged states, through explicit-state model checking. So,
we define a much simpler model that can be used, without
compromising the soundness or completeness of the analy-
sis (compared to SPVP).
3.4.2 Reduced Path Vector Protocol (RPVP)
We now describe RPVP, which is specifically designed for
explicit-state model checking of the converged states of the
extended SPVP protocol.
In RPVP, the message passing model of SPVP is replaced
with a shared memory model. The network state only con-
sists of the values of the best known path of each node at
each moment (best-path). In the initial state, the best path
of all nodes is ⊥, except origins, whose best path is ε. At
each step, the set of all enabled nodes (E) is determined (Al-
gorithm 1, line 5). A node n is considered enabled if either i)
the current best path p of n is invalid, meaning that the next
hop in p has a best path that is not a prefix of p.
invalid(n), best-path(best-path(n).head) 6= best-path(n).rest
Algorithm 1 RPVP
1: procedure RPVP(:)
2: Init : ∀n ∈N −Origins.best-path(n)←⊥
3: Init : ∀o ∈Origins.best-path(o) = ε
4: while true do:
5: E← {n ∈N | invalid(n)∨∃n′ ∈ peers(n).can-updaten(n′)}
6: ifE = ∅ then:
7: break
8: end if
9: n← nondet-pick(E)
10: if invalid(n) then
11: best-path(n)←⊥
12: end if
13: U ← best({n′ ∈ peers(n)|can-updaten(n′)})
14: n′← nondet-pick(U)
15: p← importn,n′ (exportn′,n(best-path(n′)))
16: best-path(n)← p
17: end while
18: end procedure
Or ii) there is a node n′ among the peers of n that can
produce an advertisement which will change the current best
path of n. In other words, n′ has a path better than the current
best path of n, and the path is acceptable according to the
export and import policies of n′ and n respectively.
can-updaten(n′), better(importn,n’(exportn’,n(best(n′)),best(n))
Where bettern(p,p′) is true when path p is preferred over
p′ according to the ranking function of n.
At any step of the execution, if there is no enabled node,
RPVP has reached a converged state. Otherwise a node n
is non-deterministically picked among the enabled set (line
9). If the current best path of n is invalid, the best path is
set to ⊥. Among all peers of n that can produce adver-
tisements that can update the best path of n, the neighbors
that produce the highest ranking advertisements are selected
(line 13). Note that in our model we allow multiple paths
to have the same rank, so there may be more than one el-
ements in the set U . Among the updates, one peer n′ is
non-deterministically selected and the best path of n is up-
dated according to the advertisement of n′ (lines 14-16). By
the end of line 16, an iteration of RPVP is finished. Note
that there are no explicit advertisements propagated; instead
nodes are polled for the advertisement that they would gen-
erate based on their current best path when needed. The
the protocol terminates once a converged state for the tar-
get equivalence class is reached. RPVP does not define the
semantics of failure or any change to the ranking functions.
Any topology changes to be verified are made before the pro-
tocol starts its execution and the latest version of the ranking
functions are considered.
A natural question is whether or not performing analysis
using RPVP is sound and complete with respect to SPVP.
Soundness is trivial as each step of RPVP can be simulated
using a few steps of SPVP. If we are only concerned about
the converged states, RPVP is complete as well:
Theorem 1. For any converged state reachable from the ini-
tial state of the network with a particular set of links L fail-
ing at certain steps during the execution of SPVP, there is an
execution of RPVP with the same import/export filters and
ranking functions equal to the latest version of ranking func-
tions in the execution of SPVP, which starts from the initial
state in which all links in L have failed before the protocol
execution starts, and reaches the same converged state. Par-
ticularly, there is a such execution in which at each step, each
node takes a best path that does not change during the rest
of the execution.
Proof. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 implies that performing model checking us-
ing the RPVP model is complete. Note that RPVP does not
preserve all the transient states and the divergent behaviors
of SPVP. This frees us from checking unnecessary states as
we are only interested in the converged states. Yet, even
the reduced state space has a significant amount of irrele-
vant non-determinism. Consequently, we rely on a suite of
other domain-specific optimizations (§ 4) to eliminate much
of this non-determinism and make model checking practical.
Note that our presentation of RPVP has assumed the that
a single best path is picked by each node. This matches
our current implementation in that we do not support multi-
path in all protocols. In a special-case deviation from RPVP,
our implementation allows a node running OSPF to main-
tain multiple best paths, chosen based on multiple neighbors.
While we could extend our protocol abstraction to allow
multiple best paths at each node, it wouldn’t reflect the real-
world behavior of BGP which, even when multipath is con-
figured, makes routing decisions based on a single best path.
However, such an extension is valid under the constrained fil-
tering and ranking techniques of shortest path routing. Our
theorems can be extended to incorporate multipath in such
protocols. We omit that to preserve clarity.
3.5 Policies
We primarily target verification of data plane policies over
converged states of the network. Similar to VeriFlow [15],
we don’t implement a special declarative language for poli-
cies; a policy is simply an arbitrary function computed over
a data plane state and returning a Boolean value. Plankton
implements a Policy API where a policy supplies a callback
which will be invoked each time the model checker generates
a converged state. Plankton gives the callback the newly-
computed converged data plane for a particular PEC, as well
as the relevant converged states of any other PEC that the
current PEC depends on. Plankton checks the callback’s re-
turn value, and if the policy has failed, it writes a trail file
describing the execution path taken to reach the particular
converged state.
Our API allows a policy to give additional information to
help optimize Plankton’s search: source nodes and interest-
ing nodes. We define two converged data plane states for a
PEC to be equivalent if their paths from the source nodes
have the same length and the same interesting nodes are in
the same position on the path. Plankton may suppress check-
ing a converged state if an equivalent one (from the perspec-
tive of that policy) has already been checked (§ 4.2 and § 4.3
describe how Plankton does this). If source and interesting
nodes are not supplied, Plankton by default assumes that all
nodes might be sources and might be interesting.
As an example, consider a waypoint policy: traffic from
a set S of sources must pass through firewalls F . The pol-
icy specifies sources S, interesting nodes F , and the callback
function steps through each path starting at S and fails when
it finds a path that does not contain a member of F . As an-
other example, a loop policy can’t optimize as aggressively:
it has to consider all sources.
In general, this API enables any policy that is a function of
a single PEC’s converged data plane state. We have found
it simple to add new policies, currently including: Reach-
ability, Waypointing, Loop Freedom, BlackHole Freedom,
Bounded Path Length and Multipath Consistency [1]. We
highlight several classes of policies that fall outside this API:
(i) Policies that inspect the converged control plane state, as
opposed to the data plane: while not yet strictly in the clean
API, this information is easily available and we implemented
a representative example, Path Consistency (§5), which as-
serts that the control plane state as well as the data plane
paths for a set of devices should be identical in the converged
state (similar to Local Equivalence in Minesweeper [1]). (ii)
Policies that require multiple PECs, e.g., “packets to two des-
tinations use the same firewall”. This would be an easy ex-
tension, leveraging Plankton’s PEC-dependency mechanism,
but we have not performed a performance evaluation. (iii)
Policies that inspect dynamic behavior, e.g., “no transient
loops prior to convergence”, are out of scope just as they
are for all current configuration verification tools.
4 Optimizations
Although Plankton’s RPVP-based control plane greatly re-
duces the state space, naive model checking is still not ef-
ficient enough to scale to large networks. We address this
challenge through optimizations that fall into two major cat-
egories — reducing the search space of the model checker,
and making the search more efficient.
4.1 Partial Order Reduction
A well-known optimization technique in explicit-state model
checking, Partial Order Reduction (POR) involves exploring
a set of events only in one order, if the various orderings will
result in the same outcome. In general, precisely answering
whether the order of execution affects the outcome can be
as hard as model checking itself. Model checkers such as
SPIN provide conservative heuristics to achieve some reduc-
tion. However, in our experiments, this feature did not yield
any reduction. We believe this is because our model of the
network has only a single process, and SPIN’s heuristics are
designed to apply only in a multiprocess environment. Even
if we could restructure the model to use SPIN’s heuristics,
we do not expect significant reductions, as evidenced in past
work [4]. Instead, we implement POR heuristics, based on
our knowledge of the RPVP control plane†.
4.1.1 Explore consistent executions only
To describe this optimization, we first introduce the notion of
a consistent execution: For a converged state S and a partial
execution of RPVP pi , we say that pi is consistent with S iff
at each step of the execution, a node picks a path that is equal
to it its best path in S and never changes it.
Readers may notice that Theorem 1 asserts the existence
of a consistent execution leading to each converged state of
the network, once any failures have happened. This implies
that if the model checker was to explore only executions that
are consistent with some converged state, completeness of
the search would not be compromised (soundness is not vi-
olated since every such execution is a valid execution). Of
course, when we start the exploration, we cannot know the
exact executions that are consistent with some converged
state, and hence need to be checked. So, we conservatively
assume that every execution we explore is relevant, and if we
get evidence to the contrary (like a device having to change
a selected best path), we stop exploring that execution.
4.1.2 Deterministic nodes
Even when there is the possibility of non-deterministic con-
vergence, the “relevant” non-determinism is typically local-
ized. In other words, after each non-deterministic choice,
there is a significant amount of essentially deterministic be-
havior before the opportunity for another non-deterministic
choice, if any, arises. (We consider it analogous to endgames
in chess, but applicable at any point in the protocol ex-
ecution.) However, this is obscured by “irrelevant” non-
determinism – particularly, ordering between node execution
that doesn’t impact the converged state. Our goal is to prune
the irrelevant non-determinism to reduce the search space for
Plankton’s model checker.
For an enabled node n in state S with a single best up-
date u, we say n is deterministic if in all possible converged
states reachable from S, n will have the path selected after
n processes u. Of course, with the model checker having
only partially executed the protocol, it is highly non-obvious
which nodes are deterministic! Nevertheless, suppose for a
moment we have a way to identify at least some determinis-
tic nodes. How could we use this information? At each step
of RPVP, after finding the set of enabled nodes, if we can
identify at least one deterministic enabled node, we choose
one of these nodes and instruct SPIN to process its update.
†Since we wish to check all converged states of the network, it can be
argued that any reduction in search space is essentially POR. But here, we
are referring optimizations that have a localized scope.
(More specifically, we pick one arbitrarily.) This avoids the
costly non-deterministic branching caused by having to ex-
plore the numerous execution paths where each one of the
enabled nodes is the one executed next. The following theo-
rem shows this is safe.
Theorem 2. Any partial execution of RPVP consistent with
a converged state can be extended to a complete execution
consistent with that state.
Proof. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
By definition, choosing any deterministic node as the sin-
gle node to execute next produces a new state that remains
consistent with all possible converged states reachable from
the prior state. Thus, Theorem 2 implies this determinis-
tic choice does not eliminate any converged states from be-
ing reachable, preserving completeness. Note that this op-
timization does not require the entire network to have one
converged state; it can apply at every step of the execution,
possibly between non-deterministic choices.
What remains is the key: how can we identify determin-
istic nodes? Perfect identification is too much to hope for,
and we allow our heuristics to return fewer deterministic
nodes than actually exist. We build heuristics that are spe-
cific to each routing protocol, prioritizing speed and simplic-
ity above handling atypical cases like circular route redistri-
bution.
For OSPF, our detection algorithm runs a network-wide
shortest path computation, and picks each node only after
all nodes with shorter paths have executed. We cache this
computation so it is only run once for a given topology, set
of failures, and set of sources.
For BGP, the detection algorithm performs the following
computation: For each node which is enabled to update its
best path, it checks whether there exists a pending update
that would never get replaced, because the update would
definitely be preferred over other updates that are enabled
now or may be in the future. To check this, we follow the
node’s BGP decision process, so if the update is tied for
most-preferred in one step it moves to the next. For each step
of the decision process, the preference calculation is quite
conservative. For local pref, it marks an update as the win-
ner if it matches an import filter that explicitly gives it the
highest local pref among all import filters. For AS Path, the
path length of the current update must be the minimum pos-
sible in the topology. For IGP cost, the update must be from
the peer with minimum cost. If at any node, any update is
found to be a clear winner, the node is picked as a determin-
istic node, and is allowed to process the update. If no node is
found that has a clear winner but there is a node that has ≥ 2
updates tied for the most preferred, then we deterministically
pick any one such node and have SPIN non-deterministically
choose which of the multiple updates to process. Figure 6 il-
lustrates these scenarios on a BGP network, highlighting one
sequence of node selections (out of many possible).
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Figure 6: Step-by-step choice of deterministic nodes (Each node
has a different AS number).
The detection algorithm may fail to detect some determin-
istic nodes. For instance, suppose node N is deterministic
but its import filter from neighbor M sets the highest lo-
cal pref for updates with a particular community attribute,
and M can never assign that attribute. Then the detection
algorithm will fail to mark N as deterministic. But success-
fully identifying at least one deterministic node in a step will
avoid non-deterministic branching at that step. As long as
this happens frequently, the optimization will be helpful.
Even if the decision on a node is ambiguous in a particular
state, the system will often make progress to a state where
ambiguities can be resolved. In the example above, once
M selects a path (and therefore will never change its path
as described in § 4.1.1), the detection algorithm no longer
needs to account for a possible more-preferred update from
it, and may then be able to conclude that N is deterministic.
4.1.3 Decision independence
If nodeA’s actions are independent of any future decisions of
node B and vice versa, then the execution ordering between
A and B does not matter. We check a sufficient condition
for independence: any route advertisements passed between
these nodes, in either direction, must pass through a node
that has already made its best path decision (and therefore
will not transmit any further updates). In this case, we pick
a single arbitrary execution order between A and B.
4.1.4 Failure ordering
As stated in § 3.4.2, the model checker performs all topol-
ogy changes before the protocol starts execution. We also
enforce a strict ordering of link failures, reducing branching
even further.
4.2 Policy-based Pruning
Policy-based pruning limits protocol execution to those parts
of the network that are relevant to the satisfaction/failure of
the policy. When a policy defines a set of source nodes
(§ 3.5), it indicates that the policy can be checked by ana-
lyzing the forwarding from those nodes only. The best ex-
ample for this is reachability, which is checked from a par-
ticular set of starting nodes. When an execution reaches a
state where all source nodes have made their best-path de-
cision, Plankton considers the execution, which is assumed
to be consistent, to have finished. In the cases where only a
single prefix is defined in a PEC, Plankton performs a more
aggressive pruning, based on the influence relation. Any de-
vice that cannot influence a source node is not allowed to ex-
ecute. With some additional bookkeeping, the optimization
can be extended to cases where multiple prefixes contribute
to a PEC, but our current implementation does not support
this. The optimization is also not sound when applied to
PECs on which other PECs depend. A router that does not
speak BGP may not directly influence a source node, but it
may influence the routing for the router IP addresses, which
in turn may affect the chosen path of the source node. So,
the optimization is not applied in such cases.
4.3 Choice of Failures
In addition to the total ordering of failures described in
§ 4.1.4, Plankton also attempts to reduce the number of fail-
ures that are explored, using equivalence partitioning of de-
vices as proposed by Bonsai [2]. Bonsai groups devices in
the network into abstract nodes, creating a smaller topology
overall for verification. Plankton computes Device Equiva-
lence Classes (DECs) similarly, and defines a Link Equiv-
alence Class (LEC) as the set of links between two DECs.
For each link failure, Plankton then explores only one repre-
sentative from each LEC. When exploring multiple failures,
we refine the DECs and LECs after each selection. Note that
this optimization limits the choice of failed links, but the ver-
ification happens on the original input network. In order to
avoid remapping interesting nodes (§ 3.5), they are each as-
signed to a separate DEC. Since the computed DECs can be
different for each PEC, this optimization is done only when
there are no cross-PEC dependencies.
4.4 State Hashing
During the exhaustive exploration of the state space, the ex-
plicit state model checker needs to track a large number of
states simultaneously. A single network state consists of a
copy of all the protocol-specific state variables at all the de-
vices. Maintaining millions of copies of these variables is
naturally expensive, and in fact, unnecessary. A routing de-
cision at one device doesn’t immediately affect the variables
at any of the other devices. Plankton leverages this property
to the reduce memory footprint, storing routing table entries
as 64-bit pointers to the actual entry, with each entry stored
once and indexed in a hash table. We believe this optimiza-
tion can be applied to other variables in the network state
too, as long as they are not updated frequently. Picking the
right variables to optimize this way, and developing more
advanced hash-based schemes, can be explored in the future.
5 Evaluation
We prototyped Plankton including the equivalence class
computation, control plane model, policy API and optimiza-
tions in 373 lines of Promela and 4870 lines of C++, ex-
cluding the SPIN model checker. We experimented with our
prototype on Ubuntu 16.04 running on a 3.4 GHz Intel Xeon
processor with 32 hardware threads and 188 GB RAM.
We begin our evaluation with simple hand-created topolo-
gies incorporating protocol characteristics such as shortest
path routing, non-deterministic protocol convergence, redis-
tribution, recursive routing, etc. Among these tests, we in-
corporated examples of non-deterministic protocol execution
from [8], as well as BGP wedgies, which are policy viola-
tions which can occur only under some non-deterministic
execution paths. In each of these cases, Plankton correctly
finds any violations that are present.
Having tested basic correctness, we next evaluate perfor-
mance and compare to past verifiers. What sets Plankton
apart from tools other than Minesweeper is its higher data
plane coverage and ability to handle multiple protocols (Fig-
ure 1). We therefore compare primarily with Minesweeper
but also include ARC in some tests.
We also evaluated Bonsai [2], a preprocessing technique
that helps improve the scalability of configuration verifica-
tion, for specific policies. Bonsai could assist any configura-
tion verifier. We integrated Bonsai with Plankton, and exper-
imentally compare the performance of Bonsai+Minesweeper
and Bonsai+Plankton. However, it is important to study the
performance of these tools without Bonsai too: Bonsai’s net-
work compression cannot be applied if the correctness is to
be evaluated under link failures, or if the policy being evalu-
ated is not preserved by Bonsai.
Experiments with synthetic configurations
Our first set of performance tests uses fat trees. We con-
struct fat trees of increasing sizes, with each edge switch
originating a prefix into OSPF. Link weights are identical.
We check these networks for routing loops. In order to cause
violations, we install static routes at the core routers. In our
first set of experiments, the static routes match the routes
that OSPF would eventually compute, so there are no loops.
Then, we change the static routes such that some of the traf-
fic falls into a routing loop. Figure 7(a) illustrates the time
and memory consumed, using Plankton running on various
numbers of cores, and using Minesweeper. We observed that
under default settings, Minesweeper’s CPU utilization keeps
changing, ranging from 100% to 1,600%. In this experiment
and all others where we run both Minesweeper and Plankton,
the two tools produced the same policy verification results.
This serves as an additional correctness check for Plankton.
Bonsai is not used, because its currently available implemen-
tation does not appear to support loop policies.
As the results show, Plankton scales well with input net-
work size. The speed and memory consumption varies as
expected with the degree of parallelism. Even on a single
core, Plankton is quicker than Minesweeper for all topolo-
gies. For larger networks, Plankton is several orders of mag-
nitude quicker. On the memory front, even on 16 cores,
Plankton’s footprint is smaller than Minesweeper’s.
Encouraged by the good performance numbers, we scale
up to very large fat trees (Figure 7(b)). Here, Minesweeper
doesn’t finish even in 4 hours, even with a 500-device net-
work (in the case of passing loop check, even in a 245-device
network). So, we did not run Minesweeper on the larger net-
works. We run Plankton with a single CPU core only, to
illustrate its time-memory tradeoff: since the analyses of in-
dividual PECs are fully independent and of identical compu-
tational effort, running with n cores would reduce the time
by n×, and increase memory by n×. For example, in the
2,205-device network, Plankton uses about 170 GB per pro-
cess. Policies that check a single equivalence class are much
cheaper: for example, single-IP reachability finishes in sec-
onds or minutes even on the largest networks (Figure 7(b)).
Next, we test Plankton with a very high degree of non-
determinism. We evaluated a data center setting with BGP,
which is often employed to provide layer 3 routing down
to the rack level in modern data centers [17]. We config-
ure BGP as described in RFC 7938 [17] on fat trees of vari-
ous sizes. Furthermore, we suppose that the network opera-
tor intends traffic to pass through any of a set of acceptable
waypoints on the aggregation layer switches (e.g., imagine
the switches implement a certain monitoring function). We
pick a random subset of aggregation switches as the way-
points in each experiment. However, we create a “miscon-
figuration” that prevents multipath and fails to steer routes
through the waypoints‡. Thus, in this scenario, whether the
selected path passes through a waypoint depends on the or-
der in which updates are received at various nodes, due to
age-based tie breaking [16]. We check waypoint policies
which state that the path between two edge switches should
pass through one of the waypoints. Plankton evaluates vari-
ous non-deterministic convergence paths in the network, and
determines a violating sequence of events. Time and mem-
ory both depend somewhat on the chosen set of aggregation
switches, but even the worst-case times are less than 2 sec-
onds (Figure 7(c)). We consider this a success of our policy-
based pruning optimization: the network has too many con-
verged states to be verified in reasonable time, but many have
equivalent results in terms of the policy.
Experiments with semi-synthetic configurations
We use real-world AS topologies and associated OSPF link
weights obtained from RocketFuel [24]. We pick a random
ingress point that has more than one link incident on it. We
verify that with any single link failure, all destination pre-
fixes are reachable from that ingress. Here, Minesweeper’s
SMT-based search algorithm could be beneficial, due to the
large search space created by failures. Nevertheless, Plank-
ton performs consistently better in both time and memory
(Figure 7(d)). Both tools find a violation in each case. The
time taken by Plankton with 16 and 32 cores are often iden-
tical, since a violation is found in the first set of PECs. Note
‡This setup is convenient for practical reasons, as our current Plankton
prototype implementation does not support BGP multipath.
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Figure 7: Plankton experiments. Bars and lines/points denote time and memory consumption, respectively.
that in this experiment and the next, we did not use Bon-
sai, because (i) it cannot be used for checks involving link
failures, and (ii) the topology has hardly any symmetry that
Bonsai could exploit.
To evaluate our handling of PEC dependencies, we config-
ure iBGP over OSPF on the AS topologies. The iBGP pre-
fixes rely on the underlying OSPF routing process to reach
the next hop. We check that packets destined to the iBGP-
announced prefixes are correctly delivered. It is worth not-
ing that this test evaluates a feature that, to the best of our
knowledge, is provided only by Plankton and Minesweeper.
Thanks to the dependency-aware scheduler, Plankton per-
forms multiple orders of magnitude better (Figure 7(e)). This
is unsurprising: Minesweeper’s approach of duplicating the
network forces it to solve a much harder problem here, some-
times over 300× larger.
Integration with Bonsai
We integrated Plankton with Bonsai to take advantage of
control plane compression when permitted by the specific
verification task at hand. We test this integration experi-
mentally by checking Bounded Path Length and Reachabil-
ity policies on fat trees running OSPF. The symmetric nature
of fat trees is key for Bonsai to have a significant impact. We
measure the time taken by Plankton and Minesweeper, after
Bonsai preprocesses the network. Plankton still outperforms
Minesweeper by multiple orders of magnitude (Figure 7(f)).
Comparison with ARC
Having evaluated Plankton’s performance in comparison
with Minesweeper, we move on to comparing the perfor-
mance of Plankton and ARC. ARC is specifically designed
to check shortest-path routing under failures, so we expected
the performance to be much better than the more general-
purpose Plankton, when checking networks compatible with
ARC. We check all-to-all reachability in fat trees and AS
topologies running OSPF, under a maximum of 0, 1 and 2
link failures. Similar to Minesweeper, ARC’s CPU utiliza-
tion ranges from 100% to 600% under default settings. We
allocate 8 cores to Plankton. Plankton is multiple orders of
magnitude faster in most cases (Figure 7(g)).§ This is gen-
uinely surprising; one reason that may explain the observa-
tion is that ARC always computes separate models for each
source-destination pair, whereas Plankton computes them
based only the destination, when verifying destination ad-
dress routing. Nevertheless, we do not believe that there is
a fundamental limitation in ARC’s design that would pre-
vent it from outperforming Plankton on the networks that
can be checked by either tool. Interestingly, while ARC’s
resiliency-focused algorithm doesn’t scale as easily as Plank-
ton for larger networks, its performance actually sometimes
slightly improves when the number of failures to be checked
increases. Plankton on the other hand scales poorly when
checking increasing levels of resiliency. We do not find this
concerning, since most interesting checks in the real world
involve only a small number of failures. When we performed
these experiments with Minesweeper, no check involving 2
failures ran to completion except the smallest fat tree.
Testing with real configurations
We used Plankton to verify 10 different real-world configu-
rations from 3 different organizations, including the publicly
available Stanford dataset. We first check reachability, way-
pointing and bounded path length policies on these networks,
with and without failures. All except one of these networks
use some form of recursive routing, such as indirect static
§Our numbers for ARC are similar to those reported by its authors for
similar sized networks, so we believe we have not misconfigured ARC.
Experiment Optimizations Time Memory
Ring, OSPF, 4 nodes, 1 failure
All 343 µs 137.43 MB
None 1.56 ms 137.39 MB
Ring, OSPF, 8 nodes, 1 Failure
All 623 µs 143.22 MB
None 0.13 s 137.04 MB
Ring, OSPF, 16 nodes, 1 Failure
All 2.44 ms 137.89 MB
None 266.48 s 7615.57 MB
Fat tree, OSPF, 20 nodes
All 464 µs 551.73 MB
None > 5 min > 8983.55 MB
Fat tree, OSPF, 245 nodes
All 4.297 s 1908 MB
All but link failure opt. 64.97 s 72862 MB
AS 1221 iBGP
All 27.54 s 254.22 MB
All but deterministic node opt. 25.43 s 254.34 MB
Fat tree, BGP, 20 nodes
All 46 ms 137 MB
All but deterministic node opt. > 5 min > 6144 MB
All but policy-based pruning > 5 min > 6144 MB
Figure 8: Experiments with optimizations disabled/limited
routes or iBGP. We feel that this highlights the significance
of Plankton’s and Minesweeper’s support for such config-
urations. Moreover, the PEC dependency graph for these
networks did not have any strongly connected components
larger than a single PEC, which matches yet another of our
expectations. Interestingly, we did find that the PEC depen-
dency graph had self loops, with a static route pointing to a
next hop IP within the prefix being matched. It is also note-
worthy that in these experiments, the only non-determinism
was in the choice of links that failed, which substantiates
our argument that network configurations in the real world
are largely deterministic. Figure 7(h) illustrates the results,
which indicate that Plankton can handle the complexity of
real-world configuration verification.
In our next experiment with real world configs, we identify
three networks where Loop, Multipath Consistency and Path
Consistency policies are meaningful and non-trivial to check.
We check these policies with and without link failures. Fig-
ure 7(i) illustrates the results of this experiment. The results
indicate that the breadth of Plankton’s policies scale well on
real world networks. The Batfish parser, which is used by
Minesweeper, was incompatible with the configurations, so
we could not check these configs on Minesweeper (checking
the Stanford dataset failed after parsing). However, the num-
bers we observe are significantly better than those reported
for Minesweeper on similar-sized networks, for similar poli-
cies.
Optimization Cost/Effectiveness
To determine the effectiveness of Plankton’s optimizations,
we perform experiments with some optimizations disabled
or limited. Figure 8 illustrates the results from these exper-
iments. When all optimizations are turned off, naive model
checking fails to scale beyond the most trivial of networks.
The optimizations reduce the state space by 4.95× in smaller
networks and by as much 24,968× in larger ones.
To evaluate device-equivalence based optimizations in
picking failed links, we perform loop check on fat trees run-
ning OSPF under single link failure with the optimization
turned off. We observed a 15× reduction in speed, and a
38× increase in memory overhead, indicating the effective-
ness of the optimization in networks with high symmetry.
Experiment No Bitstate Hashing Bitstate Hashing
180 Node BGP DC Waypoint (Worst Case) 202 MB 67 MB
320 Node BGP DC Waypoint (Worst Case) 428 MB 215 MB
AS 1239 Fault Tolerance (2 cores) 7.33 GB 4.52 GB
AS 1221 Fault Tolerance (1 core) 163.53 MB 60 MB
Figure 9: The effect of bitstate hashing on memory usage
In the next set of experiments, we measure the impact of
our partial order reduction technique of prioritizing deter-
ministic nodes (§ 4.1.2). We first try the iBGP reachability
experiment with the AS 1221 topology, with the detection
of deterministic nodes in BGP disabled. We notice that in
this case the decision independence partial order reduction
produces reductions identical to the disabled optimization,
keeping the overall performance unaffected. In fact, the the
time improves by a small percentage, since there is no detec-
tion algorithm that runs at every step. We see similar results
when we disable the optimization on the edge switches in our
BGP data center example. However, this does not mean that
the deterministic node detection can be discarded — in the
BGP data center example, when the optimization is disabled
altogether, the performance falls dramatically. The next opti-
mization that we study is policy-based pruning. On the BGP
data center example, we attempt to check a waypoint policy,
with policy-based optimizations turned off. The check times
out, since it is forced to generate every converged data plane,
not just the ones relevant to the policy.
SPIN provides a built-in optimization called bitstate hash-
ing that uses a Bloom filter to keep track of explored states,
rather than storing them explicitly. This can cause some false
negatives due to reduced coverage of execution paths. We
find that bit state hashing provides significant reduction in
memory in a variety of our test cases (Figure 9). According
to SPIN’s statistics our coverage would be over 99.9%. Nev-
ertheless, we have not turned on bitstate hashing in our other
experiments in favor of full correctness.
6 Limitations
Some of the limitations of Plankton, such as the lack of sup-
port for BGP multipath and limited support for route aggre-
gation, have been mentioned in previous sections. As dis-
cussed in § 3.2, Plankton may also produce false positives
when checking networks with cross-PEC dependencies, be-
cause it expects that every converged state of a PEC may co-
exist with every converged state of other PECs that depend
on it. However, such false positives are unlikely to happen
in practice, since real-world cases of cross-PEC dependen-
cies (such as iBGP) usually involve only a single converged
state for the recursive PECs. Our current implementation
of Plankton assumes full visibility of the system to be ver-
ified, and that any dynamics will originate from inside the
system. So, influences such as external advertisements need
to be modeled using stubs that denote entities which origi-
nate them. Plankton’s technique is not suited for detecting
issues in vendor-specific protocol implementations, a lim-
itation that all existing formal configuration analysis tools
share. As with most formal verification tools, one needs
to assume that Plankton itself is correct, both in terms of
the theoretical foundations as well as the implementation.
Correct-by-construction program synthesis could help in this
regard.
7 Related Work
Data plane verification: The earlier offline network verifi-
cation techniques [19, 13] have evolved into more efficient
and real-time ones (e.g., [15, 12, 10, 26, 3, 11]), including
richer data plane models (e.g., [21, 14]). These techniques
however, cannot verify configurations prior to deployment.
Configuration verification: We discussed the state of
the art of configuration verification in § 2, and how Plank-
ton improves upon the various tools in existence. Crystal-
Net [18] emulates actual device VMs, and its results could
be fed to a data plane verifier. However, this would not
verify non-deterministic control plane dynamics. Simulta-
neously improving the fidelity of configuration verifiers in
both dimensions (capturing dynamics as in Plankton and
implementation-specific behavior as in CrystalNet) appears
to be a difficult open problem.
Optimizing network verification: Libra [27] is a divide-
and-conquer data plane verifier, which is related to our
equivalence class-based partitioning of possible packets. The
use of symmetry to scale verification has been studied in the
data plane [22] and control plane (Bonsai [2]). We have dis-
cussed how Plankton uses ideas similar to Bonsai, as well as
integrates with Bonsai itself.
Model checking in the networking domain: Past ap-
proaches that used model checking in the networking do-
main have focused almost exclusively on the network soft-
ware itself, either as SDN controllers, or protocol implemen-
tations [4, 23, 20]. Plankton uses model checking not to ver-
ify software, but to verify configurations.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We described Plankton, a formal network configuration ver-
ification tool that combines equivalence partitioning of the
header space with explicit state model checking of protocol
execution. Thanks to pragmatic optimizations such as partial
order reduction and state hashing, Plankton produces signif-
icant performance gains over the state of the art in config-
uration verification. Improvements such as checking tran-
sient states, incorporating real software, partial order reduc-
tion heuristics that guarantee reduction, etc. are interesting
avenues of future work.
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A Extended SPVP
In extended SPVP, for each node n, and for each peer n′ ∈
peers(n), rib-inn(n′) keeps track of the most recent adver-
tisement of n′ to n. In addition, best-path(n) keeps the best
path that n has to one of the multiple origins. Peers are con-
nected using reliable FIFO message buffers to exchange ad-
vertisements. Each advertisement consists of a path from the
advertising node to an origin. In each step (which we assume
is performed atomically) a node n takes an advertisement
p from the buffer connected to peer n′, and applies an im-
port filter on it (importn,n′(p)). n then updates rib-inn(n′)
with the new imported advertisement. In our extension, we
assume that each node has a ranking function λ that pro-
vides a partial order over the paths acceptable by the node.
n then proceeds by updating its best-path to the highest
ranking path in rib-inn. If the best path in rib-inn have the
same rank as the current best path and that path is still valid,
best-path(n) will not change. If the best path is updated, n
advertises the path to its peers. For each peer n′, n applies
the export filter on the path (exportn,n′(best-path(n))) be-
fore sending the advertisement.
The import filter, the export filter, and the ranking func-
tions are abstract notions that will be inferred from the con-
figuration of the node. We make reasonable assumptions
about these notions (Appendix B). Attributes such as local
pref, IGP cost, etc. are accounted for in the the ranking func-
tion and the import/export filters.
If a session between two peers fails, the messages in the
buffer are lost and the buffer cannot be used anymore. We
assume that when this happens, each peer gets ⊥ as the ad-
vertised path. Additionally, to be able to model iBGP, in
extended SPVP we allow the ranking function of any node n
to change at any time during the execution of the protocol.
This is to model cases in which for example a link failure
causes IGP costs to change. In such cases we assume that
n receives a special message to recompute its best-path ac-
cording to the new ranking function.
The state of network at each point in time consists of the
values of best-path, rib-in, and the contents of the message
buffers. In the initial state S0, the best path of the origins
is ε and the best path of the rest of the nodes are ⊥ which
indicates that the node has no path. Also for any n,n′ ∈ V ,
rib-inn(n′) is ⊥. We assume that initially the origins put
their advertisements in the message buffer to their peers, but
the rest of the buffers are empty.
An (partial) execution of SPVP is a sequence of states pi
which starts from S0 and each state is reachable by a single
atomic step of SPVP on the state before it. A converged
state in SPVP, is a state in which all buffers are empty. A
complete execution is an execution that ends in a converged
state. It is well known that there are configurations which can
make SPVP diverge in some or all execution paths. However,
our goal is to only to check the forwarding behavior in the
converged states, through explicit-state model checking. So,
we define a much simpler model that can be used, without
compromising the soundness or completeness of the analysis
(compared to SPVP).
B Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in in our theoretical
model.
• Both import/export filters return ⊥ if the filter rejects the
advertisement according to the configuration.
• All import filters reject paths that cause forwarding loops.
They also do not alter the path (unless the path is rejected).
• All export filters for each node n not rejecting an adver-
tisement, will append n at the end of the advertised path.
No other modification is made to the path.
• Path ⊥ has the lowest ranking in all ranking functions.
• The import/export filters never change during the execu-
tion of the protocol. Note that we do not make such as-
sumption for the ranking functions.
Note that these are reasonable assumptions with respect to
how real world protocols (especially BGP) work.
C Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. For a complete execution
pi = S0,S1, ...,Sc of SPVP and a state Si in that exe-
cution, for any node n, we say that n is converged in Si for
execution pi iff n has already picked the path it has in the
converged state (Sc) and does not change it:
convergedpi(n,Si),
∀j.i≤ j ≤ c : best-pathSj (n) = best-pathSc(n)
It it clear that when a node converges in an state, it remains
converged (according to the definition above).
Lemma 1. In any complete execution pi = S0,S1, ...,Sc
of SPVP, for any sate Si, for any two nodes n and n′,
if ∃l : n′ = best-pathSi(n)[l] ¶ , and best-pathSi(n′) 6=
best-pathSi(n)[l :], there is a j (i < j ≤ c) such that
best-pathSj (n) 6= best-pathSi(n).
Proof. This can be shown by a simple induction on the
length of the prefix of the best path of n from n to up
to n′ (l). If l = 1 (i.e the two nodes are directly con-
nected) then either n′ will advertise its path to n and n
and will change its path or the link between n and n′
fails in which case n will receive an advertisement with
⊥ as the path (Section 3.4.1), which causes n to change
its path. Note that the argument holds even if the ranking
function of n or n′ changes. If l > 1, assuming the claim
holds for lengths less than l, for n′′ = best-pathSi(n)[0],
either best-pathSi(n
′′) 6= best-pathSi(n)[1 :] in which
case due to induction hypothesis the claim holds, or
best-pathSi(n
′′) = best-pathSi(n)[1 :] in which case we
note that n′ = best-pathSi(n
′′)[l− 1], and since the length
of the path n′′ to n′ is less than l, by induction hypothesis
we know that eventually (i.e for a j > i) best-pathSj (n
′′) 6=
best-pathSj (n)[1 :] and by induction hypothesis this will
lead to a change in the best path of n.
¶For a path P = p0,p1, ...,pn, we denote pi by P [i] and
pi,pi+1, ...,pn by P [i :].
Corollary 1. For any complete execution pi of SPVP , for any
node n, any node along the best path of n in the converged
state converges before n.
Now consider a complete execution pi = S0,S1, ...,Sc of
SPVP. We will construct a complete execution of RPVP
with |N | steps (where N is set of all nodes) resulting in
the same converged state as Sc. We start with a topol-
ogy in which all the links that have failed during the ex-
ecution of SPVP are already failed. For any node n, we
define Cpi(n) = min{i|convergedpi(n,Si)}. Consider the
sequence n1,n2, ...,n|N | of all nodes sorted in the increas-
ing order of Cpi . Now consider the execution of RPVP
pi′ = S′0,S′1, ...,S′|N | which starts from the initial state of
RPVP and in each state S′i, (a) either node ni+1 is the picked
enabled node and the node pi =best-pathSc(ni+1)[0] is the
picked best peer, or (b) in case pi =⊥, nothing happens and
S′i+1 = S′i.
First, note that (modulo the repeated states in case b), pi′
is a valid execution of of RPVP: at each state S′i (in case
a), ni+1 is indeed an enabled node since its best path at that
state is⊥ and according to corollary 1, pi has already picked
its path: Also pi will be in the set of best peers of ni+1
(line 13 in RPVP). Assume this is not the case, i.e there exists
another peer p′ that can advertise a better path. This means
that in Sc of SPVP, p′ can send an advertisement that is better
(according to the version of ranking functions in Sc) than the
converged path of ni+1. This contradicts the fact that Sc is a
converged path.
Second, note that S′|N | is a converged state for RPVP, be-
cause otherwise, using similar reasoning as above, Sc can
not be converged. Also it is easy to see that best-pathS′|N| =
best-pathSc
Finally, note that in pi′, once a node changes its best path
from ⊥, it does not change its best path again.
Proof of Theorem 2. We begin by making two observations
about RPVP that are key to the proof:
• RPVP for a prefix can never converge to a state having loop-
ing paths.
• If a node u adopts the best path of a neighbor v, v will be
next hop of u.
Consider any converged state S. The theorem states that
any partial execution that is consistent with S can be ex-
tended to a full execution that leads to S. We prove the the-
orem by induction on the length of the longest best path in
S.
Base case: If in a network a converged state exists where the
best path at each node is of length 0, that means that each
node is either an origin or doesn’t have a best path for the
prefix. Since any execution apart from the empty execution
(where no protocol event happens) is not consistent with this
state, the theorem holds.
Induction hypothesis: If a converged state exists in a net-
work such that all best paths are of length k or less, then
any partial execution that is consistent with the converged
state can be extended to a full execution that reaches the con-
verged state.
Induction step: Consider a network with a converged state
S such that the longest best path is of length k+ 1. We
first divide the nodes in the network into two classes —
N , which are the nodes with best paths of length k or less,
and N ′, which are nodes with best paths of length k+1.
Consider a partial execution pi that is consistent with S. We
identify two possibilities for pi:
Case 1: Every node that has executed in pi falls into N . In
this case, we define a smaller network which is the subgraph
of the original network, induced by the nodes in N . In this
network, the path selections made in S will constitute a
converged state. This is because in the original network, in
the state S, the nodes in N are not enabled to make state
changes. So, we can extend pi such that we get an execution
pi′ where nodes in N match the path selections in S. Now,
we further extend pi′ with steps where each node in N ′ reads
the best path from the node that is its nexthop in S and
updates its best path. When every node in N has done this,
the overall system state will reach S.
Case 2: At least one node in N ′ has executed in pi. In
this case, we observe that since pi is consistent with S, by the
definition of a consistent execution, no node in the network
has read the state of any node in N ′. So, we can construct
an execution pi′ which has the same steps as pi, except that
any step taken by a node inN ′ is skipped. As in the previous
case, pi′ can be extended to reach a converged state in the
subgraph induced by N . We extend pi, first by using the
steps that extend pi′, and if necessary, taking additional steps
at nodes from N ′ to reach S.
